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Abstract. This paper shows how universal learning can be achieved
with expert advice. To this aim, we specify an experts algorithm with
the following characteristics: (a) it uses only feedback from the actions
actually chosen (bandit setup), (b) it can be applied with countably infi-
nite expert classes, and (c) it copes with losses that may grow in time ap-
propriately slowly. We prove loss bounds against an adaptive adversary.
From this, we obtain a master algorithm for “reactive” experts problems,
which means that the master’s actions may influence the behavior of the
adversary. Our algorithm can significantly outperform standard experts
algorithms on such problems. Finally, we combine it with a universal ex-
pert class. The resulting universal learner performs – in a certain sense –
almost as well as any computable strategy, for any online decision prob-
lem. We also specify the (worst-case) convergence speed, which is very
slow.
Keywords. Prediction with expert advice, responsive environments,
partial observation game, bandits, universal learning, asymptotic opti-
mality.
1 Introduction
Expert advice has become a well-established paradigm of machine learning in the
last decade, in particular for prediction. It is very appealing from a theoretical
point of view, as performance guarantees usually hold in the worst case, without
any (statistical) assumption on the data. Such assumptions are generally required
for other statistical learning methods, often however not resulting in stronger
guarantees.
Using expert advice in the standard way seems a rather bad idea in some
cases where the decisions of the learner or master algorithm influence the be-
havior of the environment or adversary. One example is the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma when the opponent plays “tit for tat” (see Section 4). This was noted
and resolved by [1], who introduced a “strategic expert algorithm” for so-called
reactive environments. Their algorithm works with a finite class of experts and
attains asymptotically optimal behavior. No convergence speed is asserted, and
the analysis is quite different from that of standard experts algorithms.
In this paper, we show how the more general task with a countably infinite
expert class can be accomplished, building on standard experts algorithms, and
simultaneously also bounding the convergence rate (t−
1
10 , which can be actually
improved to t−
1
3+ε). To this aim, we will combine techniques from [2–5] and
obtain a master algorithm which performs well on loss functions that may in-
crease in time. Then this is applied to (possibly) reactive problems by yielding
the control to the selected expert for an increasing period of time steps. Using a
universal expert class defined by the countable set of all programs on some fixed
universal Turing machine, we obtain an algorithm which is in a sense asymp-
totically optimal with respect to any computable strategy. An easy additional
construction guarantees that our algorithm is computable, in contrast to other
universal approaches which are non-computable [6]. To our knowledge, we also
propose the first algorithm for non-stochastic bandit problems with countably
many arms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem setup,
the notation, and the algorithm. In Sections 3, we give the (worst-case) analysis
of the master algorithm. The implications to active experts problems and a
universal master algorithms are given in Section 4. We discuss our results in
Section 5.
2 The master algorithm
Setup. We are acting in an online decision problem. “We” is here an abbre-
viation for the master algorithm which is to be designed. An “online decision
problem” is to be understood in a very general sense, it is just a sequence of
decisions each of which results in some loss. This could be e.g. a prediction task,
a repeated game, etc. In each round, that is at each time step t, we have access to
the recommendations of countably infinitely many “experts” or strategies. (For
simplicity, we restrict our notation to a countably infinite expert class, all results
also hold for finite classes.) We do not specify what exactly a “recommendation”
is – we just follow the advice of one expert. Before we reveal our move, the
adversary has to assign losses `it ≥ 0 to all experts i. There is an upper bound
Bt ≥ ‖`t‖∞ on the maximum loss the adversary may use. This quantity may
depend on t and is not controlled by the adversary. After the move, only the loss
of the selected expert i is revealed. Our goal is to perform nearly as well as the
best available strategy (expert) in terms of cumulative loss, after any number
T of time steps which is not known in advance. The difference between our loss
and the loss of some expert is also termed regret. We consider the general case of
an adaptive adversary, which may assign losses depending on our past decisions.
If there are only finitely many experts or strategies, then it is common to give
no prior preferences to any of them. Formally, this is realized by defining uniform
prior weights wi = 1n for each expert i. This is not possible for countably infinite
For t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
set ˆ`it = Bˆt for i 6∈ {t ≥ τ} (see (2))
sample rt ∈ {0, 1} independently s.t. P [rt = 1] = γt
If rt = 0 Then
invoke FPL(t) and play its decision
set ˆ`it = 0 for i ∈ {t ≥ τ}
Else
sample IFoEt := ut “uniformly”, see (1), and play I := I
FoE
t
set ˆ`It = `
I
t/(u
I
tγt) and ˆ`
i
t = 0 for i ∈ {t ≥ τ} \ {I}
Fig. 1. The algorithm FoE . The exploration rate γt will be specified in Corollary 8.
Sample qit
d.∼ Exp (i.e. P(qit ≥ x) = e−x for x ≥ 0) indep. ∀i ∈ {t ≥ τ}
select and play IFPLt = arg min
i:t≥τ
{ηt ˆ`i<t + ki − qit}
Fig. 2. The algorithm FPL. The learning rate ηt will be specified in Corollary 8.
expert classes, as there is no uniform distribution on the natural numbers. In this
case, we need some non-uniform prior (wi)i∈N and require wi > 0 for all experts
i and
∑
i w
i ≤ 1. We also define the complexity of expert i as ki = − lnwi. This
quantity is important since in the full observation game (i.e. after our decision
we get to know the losses of all experts), the regret can usually be bounded by
some function of the best expert’s complexity.
Our algorithm “Follow or Explore” (FoE , specified in Fig. 1) builds on McMa-
han and Blum’s online geometric optimization algorithm [4]. It is a bandit version
of a “Follow the Perturbed Leader” experts algorithm. This approach to online
prediction and playing repeated games has been pioneered by Hannan [2]. For
the full observation game and uniform prior, [3] gave a very elegant analysis
which is clearly different from the standard analysis of exponential weighting
schemes. It has one advantage over other aggregating algorithms such as expo-
nential weighting schemes: the analysis is not complicated if the learning rate is
dynamic rather than fixed in advance. A dynamic learning rate is necessary if
there is no target time T known in advance. For non-uniform prior, an analysis
was given in [5]. The following issues are important for FoE ’s design.
Exploration. Since we are playing the bandit game (as opposed to the full
information game), we need to explore sufficiently [7, 4]. At each time step t,
we decide randomly according to some exploration rate γt ∈ (0, 1) whether to
explore or not. If so, we would like to choose an expert according to the prior
distribution. There is a caveat: In order to make the analysis go through, we
have to assure that we are working with unbiased estimates of the losses. This is
achieved by dividing the observed loss by the probability of choosing the expert.
But this quantity could become arbitrarily large if we admit arbitrarily small
weights. We address this problem by finitizing the expert pool at each time t.
For each expert i, we define an entering time τ i, that is, expert i is active only
for t ≥ τ i. We denote the set of active experts at time t by {t ≥ τ} = {i : t ≥ τ i}.
For exploration, the prior is then replaced by the finitized prior distribution ut,
P(ut = i) =
wi1It≥τ i∑
j w
j1It≥τj
. (1)
Consequently, the maximum unbiasedly estimated instantaneous loss is (note
that the exploration probability also scales with the exploration rate γt)
Bˆt =
Bt
γtmin{wi : t ≥ τ i} . (2)
It is convenient for the analysis to assign estimated loss of Bˆt to all currently
inactive experts. Observe finally that in this way, our master algorithm FoE
always deals with a finite expert class and is thus computable.
Follow the perturbed leader (FPL, specified in Fig. 2) is invoked if FoE does
not explore. Just following the “leader” (the best expert so far) may not be a
good strategy [3]. Instead we subtract an exponentially distributed perturbation
qt from the current score (the complexity penalized past loss) of the experts. An
important detail of the FPL subroutine is the learning rate ηt > 0, which should
be adaptive if the total number of steps T is not known in advance. Please see
e.g. [3, 5] for more details. Also the variant of FPL we use (specified in Fig. 2)
works on the finitized expert pool.
Note that each time randomness is used, it is assumed to be independent of
the past randomness. Performance is evaluated in terms of true or estimated
cumulative loss, this is specified in the notation. E.g. for the true loss of FPL up
to and including time T we write `FPL1:T , while the estimated loss of FoE and not
including time T is ˆ`FoE<T .
3 Analysis on the master’s time scale
The following analysis uses McMahan and Blum’s trick [4] in order to prove
bounds against adaptive adversary. With a different argument, it is possible
to circumvent Lemma 6, thus achieving better bounds [8]. This will be briefly
discussed in the last section.
Let Bt ≥ 0 be some sequence of upper bounds on the instantaneous losses,
γt ∈ (0, 1) be a sequence of exploration rates, and ηt > 0 be a decreasing se-
quence of learning rates. The analysis proceeds according to the following di-
agram (where L is an informal abbreviation for the loss and always refers to
cumulative loss, but sometimes additionally to instantaneous loss).
LFoE <∼ ELFoE <∼ ELFPL <∼ ELˆFPL <∼ ELˆIFPL <∼ ELˆbest <∼ Lbest (3)
Each “ <∼ ” means that we bound the quantity on the left by the quantity on the
right plus some additive term. The first and the last expressions are the losses of
the FoE algorithm and the best expert, respectively. The intermediate quantities
Sample qit
d.∼ Exp independently for all i ∈ {t ≥ τ}
select and play IFPLt = arg min
i:t≥τ
{ηt ˆ`i1:t + ki − qit}
Fig. 3. The algorithm IFPL. The learning rate ηt will be specified in Corollary 8.
belong to different algorithms, namely FoE , FPL, and a third one called IFPL for
“infeasible” FPL [3]. IFPL, as specified in Fig. 3, is the same as FPL except that
it has access to an oracle providing the current estimated loss vector ˆ`t (hence
infeasible). Then it assigns scores of ηt ˆ`i1:t + k
i − qit instead of ηt ˆ`i<t + ki − qit.
The randomization of FoE and FPL gives rise to two filtrations of σ-algebras.
By At we denote the σ-algebra generated by the FoE ’s randomness up to time
t, meaning only the random variables {u1:t, r1:t}. Then (At)t≥0 is a filtration
(A0 is the trivial σ-algebra). We may also write A =
⋃
t≥0At. Similarly, Bt is
the σ-algebra generated by the FoE ’s and FPL’s randomness up to time t (i.e.
Bt=̂{u1:t, r1:t, q1:t}). Then clearly At ⊂ Bt for each t.
The reader should think of the expectations in (3) as of both ordinary and
conditional expectations. Conditional expectations are mostly with respect to
FoE ’s past randomness At−1. These conditional expectations of some random
variable X are abbreviated by
Et[X] := E[X|At−1].
Then Et[X] is an At−1-measurable random variable, meaning that its value is
determined for fixed past randomnessAt−1. Note in particular that the estimated
loss vectors ˆ`it are random vectors which depend on FoE ’s randomness At up to
time t. In this way, FoE ’s (and FPL’s and IFPL’s) actions depend on FoE ’s past
randomness. Note, however, that they do not depend on FPL’s randomness q1:t.
We now start with proving the diagram (3). In order to understand the
analysis, it is important to consider each intermediate algorithm as a stand-
alone procedure which is actually executed (with an oracle if necessary) on the
specified inputs (e.g. on the estimated losses) and has the asserted performance
guarantees (e.g. again on the estimated losses).
Lemma 1.
[
LFoE <∼ ELFoE
]
For each T ≥ 1 and δT ∈ (0, 1), with probability at
least 1− δT2 we have
`FoE1:T ≤
t∑
t=1
Et`FoEt +
√
(2 ln 4δT )
∑T
t=1B
2
t .
Proof. The sequence of random variables XT =
∑T
t=1
[
`FoEt −Et`FoEt
]
is a mar-
tingale with respect to the filtration Bt (not At!). In order to see this, observe
E[`FoET |BT−1] = E
(
E[`FoET |AT−1]
∣∣BT−1) and E[`FoEt |BT−1] = `FoEt for t < T ,
which implies
E[XT |BT−1] =
∑T
t=1
(
E[`FoEt |BT−1]−E
[
E[`FoEt |At−1]
∣∣BT−1])
=
∑T−1
t=1
(
`FoEt −E[`FoEt |At−1]
)
= XT−1.
Its differences are bounded: |Xt −Xt−1| ≤ Bt. Hence, it follows from Azuma’s
inequality (see e.g. [9]) that the probability that XT exceeds some λ > 0 is
bounded by p = 2 exp
( − λ2
2
∑
t B
2
t
)
. Requesting δT2 = p and solving for λ gives
the assertion. 2
Lemma 2.
[
E`FoE <∼ E`FPL
]
Et`FoEt ≤ (1− γt)Et`FPLt + γtBt holds ∀t ≥ 1.
This follows immediately from the specification of FoE . Clearly, a correspond-
ing assertion for the ordinary expectations holds by just taking expectations on
both sides. This is the case for all subsequent lemmas, except for Lemma 6.
The next lemma relating ELFPL and ELˆFPL is technical but intuitively clear.
It states that in expectation, the real loss suffered by FPL is the same as the
estimated loss. This is simply because the loss estimate is unbiased. A combina-
tion of this and the previous lemma was shown in [4]. Note that ˆ`FPLt is the loss
ˆ`I
t estimated by FoE , but for the expert I = I
FPL
t chosen by FPL.
Lemma 3.
[
ELFPL <∼ ELˆFPL
]
For each t ≥ 1, we have Et`FPLt = Et ˆ`FPLt .
Proof. Let f it = P[I
FPL
t = i|At−1] be the probability distribution over actions i
which FPL uses at time t, depending on the past randomness At−1. Let ut be
the finitized prior distribution (1) at time t. Then
Et[ˆ`FPLt ](1− γt) · 0 + γt
∞∑
i=1
f it [(1− uit) · 0 + uit ˆ`it|rt=1∧IFoEt =i]
∞∑
i=1
f it `
i
t = Et[`
FPL
t ],
where ˆ`it|rt=1∧IFoEt =i = `it/(uitγt) is the estimated loss under the condition that
FoE decided to explore (rt = 1) and chose action IFoEt = i. 2
The following lemma relates the losses of FPL and IFPL. It is proven in [3]
and [5]. We give the full proof, since it is the only step in the analysis where we
have to be careful with the upper loss bound Bt. Let Bˆt be the upper bound on
the estimated loss (2). (We remark that also for weighted averaging forecasters,
losses which grow sufficiently slowly do not cause any problem in the analysis.
In this way, it is straightforward to modify the algorithm by Auer et al. [10] for
reactive tasks with a finite expert class.)
Lemma 4.
[
ELˆFPL <∼ ELˆIFPL
]
For all t ≥ 1, Et ˆ`FPLt ≤ Et ˆ`IFPLt + γtηtBˆ2t holds.
Proof. If rt = 0, ˆ`t = 0 and thus ˆ`FPLt = ˆ`
IFPL
t holds. This happens with proba-
bility 1− γt. Otherwise we have
Et ˆ`FPLt =
∞∑
i=1
∫
1IIFPLt =i
ˆ`i
tdµ(x), (4)
where µ denotes the (exponential) distribution of the perturbations, i.e. xi := qit
and density µ(x) := e−‖x‖∞ . The idea is now that if action i was selected by
FPL, it is – because of the exponentially distributed perturbation – with high
probability also selected by IFPL. Formally, we write u+ = max(u, 0) for u ∈ R,
abbreviate λ = ˆ`<t + k/ηt, and denote by
∫
. . . dµ(x6=i) the integration leaving
out the ith action. Then, using ηtλi − xi ≤ ηtλj − xj ∀j if IFPLt = i in the first
equation, and Bˆt ≥ ˆ`it − ˆ`jt in the last line, we get∫
1IIFPLt =i
ˆ`i
tdµ(x) =
∫ ∫
xi≥max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj}
ˆ`i
tdµ(xi)dµ(x6=i) =
∫
ˆ`i
t e
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj})+
dµ(x6=i)
≤
∫
ˆ`i
t e
ηtBˆte
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi−λj)+xj}+ηtBˆt)+
dµ(x6=i)
≤ eηtBˆt
∫
ˆ`i
t e
−(max
j 6=i
{ηt(λi+ˆ`it−λj−ˆ`jt)+xj})+
dµ(x6=i)
= eηtBˆt
∫
1IIIFPLt =i
ˆ`i
tdµ(x).
Summing over i and using the analog of (4) for IFPL, we see that if rt = 1, then
Et ˆ`FPLt ≤ eηtBˆtEt ˆ`IFPLt holds. Thus Et ˆ`IFPLt ≥ e−ηtBˆtEt ˆ`FPLt ≥ (1−ηtBˆt)Et ˆ`FPLt ≥
Et ˆ`FPLt − ηtBˆ2t . The assertion now follows by taking expectations w.r.t. rt. 2
The next lemma relates the losses of IFPL and the best action in hindsight.
For an oblivious adversary (which means that the adversary’s decisions do not
depend on our past actions), the proof is quite simple [3]. An additional step is
necessary for an adaptive adversary [11].
Lemma 5.
[
ELˆIFPL <∼ ELˆbest
]
Assume that
∑
i e
−ki ≤ 1 and τ i depends mono-
tonically on ki, i.e. τ i ≥ τ j if and only if ki ≥ kj. Assume decreasing learning
rate ηt. For all T ≥ 1 and all i ≥ 1,
T∑
t=1
Et ˆ`IFPLt ≤ ˆ`i1:T + k
i+1
ηT
.
Proof. This is a modification of the corresponding proofs in [3] and [5]. We may
fix the randomization A and suppress it in the notation. Then we only need to
show
Eˆ`IFPL1:T ≤ min
i≥1
{ˆ`i1:T + k
i+1
ηT
}, (5)
where the expectation is with respect to IFPL’s randomness q1:T .
Assume first that the adversary is oblivious. We define an algorithm A as a
variant of IFPL which samples only one perturbation vector q in the beginning
and uses this in each time step, i.e. qt ≡ q. Since the adversary is oblivious, A
is equivalent to IFPL in terms of expected performance. This is all we need to
show (5). Let η0 = ∞ and λt = ˆ`t + (k − q)
(
1
ηt
− 1ηt−1
)
, then λ1:t = ˆ`1:t + k−qηt .
Recall {t ≥ τ} = {i : t ≥ τ i}. We argue by induction that for all T ≥ 1,
T∑
t=1
λAt ≤ min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
}
. (6)
This clearly holds for T = 0. For the induction step, we have to show
min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
}
+ λAT+1 ≤ λ
IAT+1
1:T + max
T+1≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT+1
}
+ λ
IAT+1
T+1 (7)
= min
T+1≥τ
λi1:T+1 + max
T+1≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT+1
}
.
The inequality is obvious if IAT+1 ∈ {T ≥ τ}. Otherwise, let J = argmax
{
qi−ki :
i ∈ {T ≥ τ}}. Then
min
T≥τ
λi1:T +max
T≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT
} ≤ λJ1:T + qJ−kJηT = T∑
t=1
ˆ`J
t ≤
T∑
t=1
Bˆt
=
∑T
t=1
ˆ`I
A
T+1
t ≤ λ
IAT+1
1:T + max
T+1≥τ
{
qi−ki
ηT+1
}
shows (7). Rearranging terms in (6), we see
T∑
t=1
ˆ`A
t ≤ min
T≥τ
λi1:T+max
T≥τ i
{
qi−ki
ηT
}
+
T∑
t=1
(q−k)IAt ( 1ηt− 1ηt−1 )
The assertion (5) – still for oblivious adversary and qt ≡ q – then follows by
taking expectations and using
Emin
T≥τ
λi1:T ≤ min
T≥τ
{ˆ`i1:T + k
i
ηT
−E qiηT } ≤ mini≥1 {
ˆ`i
1:T +
ki−1
ηT
} and (8)
E
T∑
t=1
(q − k)IAt ( 1ηt − 1ηt−1 ) ≤ EmaxT≥τ { qi−kiηT } ≤ 1ηT . (9)
The second inequality of (8) holds because τ i depends monotonically on ki, and
Eqi = 1, and maximality of ˆ`i1:T for T < τi. The second inequality of (9) can be
proven by a simple application of the union bound, see e.g. [5, Lem.1].
Sampling the perturbations qt independently is equivalent under expectation
to sampling q only once. So assume that qt are sampled independently, i.e. that
IFPL is played against an oblivious adversary: (5) remains valid. In the last step,
we argue that then (5) also holds for an adaptive adversary. This is true because
the future actions of IFPL do not depend on its past actions, and therefore the
adversary cannot gain from deciding after having seen IFPL’s decisions. This
argument can be made formal, as shown in [11, Lemma 12]. (Note the subtlety
that the future actions of FoE would depend on its past actions.) 2
Finally, we give a relation between the estimated and true losses (adapted
from [4]).
Lemma 6.
[
ELˆbest <∼ Lbest
]
For each T ≥ 1, δT ∈ (0, 1), and i ≥ 1, we have
(i) ˆ`i1:T ≤ `i1:T +
√
(2 ln 4δT )
∑T
t=1 Bˆ
2
t +
∑τ i−1
t=1 Bˆt w.p. 1− δT2 and hence
(ii) Eˆ`i1:T ≤ `i1:T +
√
(2 ln 4δT )
∑T
t=1 Bˆ
2
t +
δT
2
∑T
t=1 Bˆt +
∑τ i−1
t=1 Bˆt.
Proof. For t ≥ τ i, Xt = ˆ`i1:t − `i1:t is a martingale, since
E[Xt|At−1] = E[ˆ`i1:t|At−1]− `i1:t = Xt−1 +E[ˆ`it|At−1]− `it = Xt−1.
It is clear that Xτ i−1 ≤
∑τ i−1
t=1 Bˆt. Moreover, |Xt−Xt−1| ≤ Bˆt for t ≥ τ i, i.e. we
have bounded differences. By Azuma’s inequality, the actual value XT −Xτ i−1
does not exceed
√
(2 ln 4δT )
∑T
t=1 Bˆ
2
t with probability 1− δT2 . This proves (i). To
arrive at (ii), take expectations and observe that (i) fails with probability at
most δT2 , in which case ˆ`
i
1:T ≤
∑T
t=1 Bˆt holds. 2
We now combine the above results and derive an upper bound on the expected
regret of FoE against an adaptive adversary.
Theorem 7. [FoE against an adaptive adversary] Let
∑
i e
−ki ≤ 1, τ i depend
monotonically on ki, and the learning rate ηt be decreasing. Let `t be some pos-
sibly adaptive assignment of (true) loss vectors satisfying ‖`t‖∞ ≤ Bt. Then for
all experts i, we have with probability at least 1− δT
`FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T+k
i+1
ηT
+
τ i−1∑
t=1
Bˆt+
T∑
t=1
γtηtBˆ
2
t+
T∑
t=1
γtBt+
√
(2 ln 4δT )

√√√√ T∑
t=1
Bˆt +
√√√√ T∑
t=1
B2t
.
Consequently, in expectation, we have
E`FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T+k
i+1
ηT
+
τ i−1∑
t=1
Bˆt+
T∑
t=1
γtηtBˆ
2
t+
T∑
t=1
γtBt+
√√√√(2 ln 4δT ) T∑
t=1
Bˆt+ δT2
T∑
t=1
Bˆt.
Proof. This follows by summing up all excess terms in the above lemmas. Recall
that we only need to take expectations on both sides of the assertions of Lemmas
2–5 in order to obtain the second bound on the expectation (and we don’t need
Lemma 1 there). 2
Corollary 8. Assume the conditions of Theorem 7 and choose ηt = t−
3
4 and
γt = t−
1
4 . Then
(i) Bt ≡ 1, τ i=d(wi)−8e ⇒ E`FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T +O
(
( 1wi )
11 + kiT
7
8
√
lnT
)
,
(ii) Bt ≡ 1, τ i=d(wi)−8e ⇒ `FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T +O
(
( 1wi )
11+kiT
7
8
√
lnT
)
w.p. 1−T−2,
(iii) Bt= t
1
16 , τ i=d(wi)−16e ⇒ E`FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T +O
(
( 1wi )
22 + kiT
7
8
√
lnT
)
, and
(iv) Bt= t
1
16 , τ i=d(wi)−16e ⇒ `FoE1:T ≤ `i1:T +O
(
( 1wi )
22+kiT
7
8
√
lnT
)
w.p. 1−T−2,
for all i and T ≥ 1 (recall ki = − lnwi). Moreover, in both cases (bounded and
growing Bt) FoE is asymptotically optimal w.r.t. each expert, i.e. for all i,
lim sup
T→∞
`FoE1:T − `i1:T
T
≤ 0 almost surely.
The asymptotic optimality is sometimes termed Hannan-consistency, in par-
ticular if the limit equals zero. We only show the upper bound.
Proof. Assertions (i)-(iv) follow from the previous theorem: Set δT = T−2, ab-
breviate wminT = min{wi : t ≥ τ i}, and observe that for τ i = d(wi)−αe and
Bt = tβ , we have
wminT = min{wi : T ≥ d(wi)−αe} ≥ min{wi : T−
1
α ≤ wie} ≥ T− 1α and
τ i−1∑
t=1
Bˆt ≤ (τ i − 1)Bˆτ i−1 ≤ (w
i)−αBτi−1
γτi−1w
min
τi−1
≤ (wi)−α(wi)−αβ
(wi)
α
4 wi
(note wminτ i−1 ≥ (τ i− 1)−
1
α ≥ (wi)(−α)(− 1α )). Then (i) and (ii) follow from α = 8,
β = 0, and (iii) and (iv) follow from α = 16, β = 116 . The asymptotic optimality
finally follows from the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, since according to (ii) and (iv),
P
[
`FoE1:T −mini `i1:T
T
> CT−
1
8
√
lnT
]
≤ 1
T 2
for an appropriate C > 0. 2
As mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, it is possible to avoid
Lemma 6, thus arriving at better bounds. E.g. in (i), choosing τ i =
⌈
( 1wi )
8
⌉
,
γt = t−
1
4 , and ηt = t−
3
4 , a regret bound of O
(
( 1wi )
11 + kiT
3
4
)
can be shown.
Of course, also a corresponding high probability bound like (ii) holds. Likewise,
for a similar statement as (iii), we may set τ i =
⌈
( 1wi )
16
⌉
, Bt = t
1
8 , γt = t−
1
4 ,
and ηt = t−
3
4 , arriving at a regret bound of O
(
( 1wi )
23+ kiT
3
4
)
Generally, in this
way any regret bound O
(
( 1wi )
c+ kiT
2
3+ε
)
is possible, at the cost of increasing c
where ε→ 0.
4 Reactive environments and a universal master
algorithm
Regret can become a quite subtle notion if we start considering reactive envi-
ronments, i.e. care for future consequences of a decision. An extreme case is the
“heaven-hell” example: We have two experts, one always playing 0 (“saying a
prayer”), the other one always playing 1 (“cursing”). If we always follow the first
expert, we stay in heaven and get no loss in each step. As soon as we “curse” only
once, we get into hell and receive maximum loss in all subsequent time steps.
Clearly, any algorithm without prior knowledge must “fail” in this situation.
set t˜ = 1
For t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
invoke FoE(t) and play its decision for Bt basic time steps
set t˜ = t˜+Bt
Fig. 4. The algorithm F˜oE , where Bt is specified in Corollary 9.
One way to get around this problem is taking into account the actual (real-
ization of the) game we are playing. For instance, after “cursing” once, also the
praying expert goes to hell together with us and subsequently has maximum loss.
Hence, were are interested in a regret defined as E`1:T − `i1:T as in the previous
section. So what is missing? This becomes clear in the following example.
Consider the repeated “prisoner’s dilemma” against the tit-for-tat3 strategy
[1]. If we use two strategies as experts, namely “always cooperate” and “always
defect”, then it is clear that always cooperating will have the best long-term
reward. However standard expert advice or bandit master algorithm will not
discover this, since it compares only the losses in one step, which are always lower
for the defecting expert. To put it differently, minimizing short-term regret is
not at all a good idea here. E.g. always defecting has no regret, while for always
cooperating the regret grows linearly. But this is only the case for short-term
regret, i.e. if we restrict to time intervals of length one.
We therefore give the control to a selected expert for periods of increasing
length. Precisely, we introduce a new time scale t˜ (the basic time scale) at which
we have single games with losses ˜`˜t. The master’s time scale t does not coincide
with t˜. Instead, at each t, the master gives control to the selected expert i
for Bt ≥ 1 single games and receives loss `it =
∑t˜(t)+Bt−1
t˜=t˜(t)
˜`i
t˜
. (The points t˜(t) in
basic time are defined recursively, see Fig. 4.) Assume that the game has bounded
instantaneous losses ˜`i
t˜
∈ [0, 1]. Then the master algorithm’s instantaneous losses
are bounded by Bt. We denote the algorithm, which is completely specified
in Fig. 4, by F˜oE . Then the following assertion is an easy consequence of the
previous results.
Corollary 9. Assume F˜oE plays a repeated game with bounded instantaneous
losses ˜`i
t˜
∈ [0, 1]. Choose γt = t− 14 , ηt = t− 34 , Bt = bt 116 c and τ i = d(wi)−16e.
Then for all experts i and all T˜ ≥ 1,
˜`˜FoE
1:T˜
≤ ˜`i
1:T˜
+O
(
( 1wi )
22 + kiT˜
9
10
)
w.p. 1− T˜− 3217 and
E ˜`˜FoE
1:T˜
≤ ˜`i
1:T˜
+O
(
( 1wi )
22 + kiT˜
9
10
)
.
3 In the prisoner’s dilemma, two players both decide independently if thy are cooper-
ating (C) or defecting (D). If both play C, they get both a small loss, if both play
D, they get a large loss. However, if one plays C and one D, the cooperating player
gets a very large loss and the defecting player no loss at all. Thus defecting is a dom-
inant strategy. Tit-for-tat plays C in the first move and afterwards the opponent’s
respective preceding move.
Consequently, lim supT→∞(˜`˜FoE1:T˜ − ˜`i1:T˜ )/T˜ ≤ 0 a.s. The rate of convergence is at
least T˜−
1
10 , and it can be improved to T˜−
1
3+ε at the cost of a larger power of 1wi .
Proof. This follows from changing the time scale from t to t˜ in Corollary 8: t˜
is of order t1+
1
16 . Consequently, the regret bound is O
(
( 1wi )
22 + kiT˜
15
17
√
ln T˜
) ≤
O
(
( 1wi )
22 + kiT˜
9
10
)
. 2
Broadly spoken, this means that FoE T˜ performs asymptotically as well as
the best expert. Asymptotic performance guarantees for the Strategic Experts
Algorithm have been derived in [1]. Our results improve upon this by providing
a rate of convergence. One can give further corollaries, e.g. in terms of flexibility
as defined in [1].
Since we can handle countably infinite expert classes, we may specify a uni-
versal experts algorithm. To this aim, let expert i be derived from the ith (valid)
program pi of some fixed universal Turing machine. The ith program can be well-
defined, e.g. by representing programs as binary strings and lexicographically
ordering them [6]. Before the expert is consulted, the relevant input is written
to the input tape of the corresponding program. If the program halts, an appro-
priate part of the output is interpreted as the expert’s recommendation. E.g. if
the decision is binary, then the first bit suffices. (If the program does not halt,
we may for well-definedness just fill its output tape with zeros.) Each expert is
assigned a prior weight by wi = 2−length(p
i), where length(pi) is the length of
the corresponding program and we assume the program tape to be binary. This
construction parallels the definition of Solomonoff’s universal prior [12].
Corollary 10. If F˜oE is used together with a universal expert class as speci-
fied above and the parameters ηt, γt, Bt, δT are chosen as in Corollary 9, then
it performs asymptotically at least as well as any computable expert i. The up-
per bound on the rate of convergence is exponential in the complexity ki and
proportional to t˜−
1
10 (improvable to t˜−
1
3+ε).
The universal prior has been used to define a universal agent AIXI in a quite
different way [13, 6]. Note that like the universal prior and the AIXI agent, our
universal experts algorithm is not computable, since we cannot check if a the
computation of an expert halts. On the other hand, if used with computable
experts, the algorithm is computationally feasible (at each time t we need to
consider only finitely many experts). Moreover, it is easy to impose an addi-
tional constraint on the computation time of each expert and abort the expert’s
computation after Ct operations on the Turing machine. We may choose some
(possibly rapidly) growing function Ct, e.g. Ct = 2t. The resulting master al-
gorithm is fully computable and has small regret with respect to all resource
bounded strategies.
It is important to keep in mind that Corollaries 9 and 10 give assertions
relative to the experts’ performance merely on the actual action-observation
sequence. In other words, if we wish to assess how well F˜oE does, we have to
evaluate the actual value of the best expert [14]. Note that the whole point of our
increasing time construction is to cause this actual value to coincide with the
value under ideal conditions. For passive tasks, this coincidence always holds
with any experts algorithm. With F˜oE , the actual and the ideal value of an
expert coincide in many further situations, such as “finitely controllable tasks”.
By this we mean cases where the best expert can drive the environment into some
optimal state in a fixed finite number of time steps. An instance is the prisoner’s
dilemma with tit-for-tat being the opponent. The following is an example for a
formalization of this statement.
Proposition 11. Suppose F˜oE acts in a (fully or partially observable) Markov
Decision Process. Let there be a computable strategy which is able to reach an
ideal (that is optimal w.r.t. reward) state sequence in a fixed number of time
steps. Then F˜oE performs asymptotically optimal.
This statement may be generalized to cases where only a close to optimal
state sequence is reached with high probability. However, we need assumptions
on the closeness to optimality for a given target probability, which are compatible
with the sampling behavior of F˜oE .
Not all environments have this or similar nice properties. As mentioned above,
any version of FoE would not perform well in the “heaven-hell” example. The
following is a slightly more interesting variant of the heaven-hell task, where
we might wish to learn optimal behavior, however FoE will not. Consider the
heaven-hell example from the beginning of this section, but assume that if at
time t I am in hell and I “pray” for t consecutive time steps, I will get back into
heaven. Then it is not hard to see that FoE ’s exploration is so dominant that
almost surely, FoE will eventually stay in hell.
Simulations with some 2×2 matrix games show similar effects, depending on
the opponent. We briefly discuss the repeated game of “chicken”4. In this game,
it is desirable for the learner to become the “dominant defector”, i.e. to defect in
the majority of the cases while the opponent cooperates. Let’s call an opponent
“primitive” if he agrees to cooperate after a fixed number of consecutive defecting
moves of FoE , and let’s call him “stubborn” if this number is high. Then FoE
learns to be the dominant defector against any primitive opponent, however
stubborn. On the other hand, if the opponent is some learning strategy which also
tries to be the dominant defector and learns faster (we conducted the experiment
with AIXI [6]), then FoE settles for cooperating, and the opponent will be the
dominant defector. Interestingly however, AIXI would not learn to defect against
a stubborn primitive opponent. Under this point of view, it seems questionable
4 This game, also known as “Hawk and Dove”, can be interpreted as follows. Two
coauthors write a paper, but each tries to spend as little effort as possible. If one
succeeds to let the other do the whole work, he has a high reward. On the other hand,
if no one does anything, there will be no paper and thus no reward. Finally, if both
decide to cooperate, both get some reward. We choose the loss matrix as
(
1 0
0.8 0.5
)
, the
learner is the column player, the opponent’s loss matrix is the transpose, choosing
the fist column means to defect, the second to cooperate. Hence, in the repeated
game, it is socially optimal to take turns cooperating and defecting.
that there is something like a universally optimal balance of exploration vs.
exploitation in active learning at all.
5 Discussion
An alternative argument for adaptive adversary. As mentioned in the
beginning of Section 3, the analysis we gave uses a trick from [4]. Such a trick
seems necessary, as the basic FPL analysis only works for oblivious adversary.
The simple argument from [11] which we used in the last paragraph of the proof
of Lemma 5 works only for full observation games (note that considering the
estimated losses, we were actually dealing with full observations there). In order
to obtain a similar result in the partial observation case, we may argue as fol-
lows. We let the game proceed for T time steps with independent randomization
against an adaptive adversary. Then we analyze FoE ’s performance in retro-
spective. In particular, we note that for the losses assigned by the adversary,
FoE ’s expected regret coincides with the regret of another, virtual algorithm,
which uses (in its FPL subroutine) identical perturbations qt ≡ q. Performing
the analysis for this virtual algorithm, we arrive at the desired assertion, however
without needing Lemma 6. This results in tighter bounds as stated above. The
argument is formally elaborated in [8].
Actual learning speed and lower bounds. In practice, the bounds we have
proven seem irrelevant except for small expert classes, although asserting almost
sure optimality and even a convergence rate. The exponential of the complexity
1
wi may be huge. Imagine for instance a moderately complex task and some good
strategy, which can be coded with mere 500 bits. Then its prior weight is 2−500, a
constant which is not distinguishable from zero in all practical situations. Thus,
it seems that the bounds can be relevant at most for small expert classes with
uniform prior. This is a general shortcoming of bandit style experts algorithms:
For uniform prior a lower bound on the expected loss which scales with
√
n
(where n is the size of the expert class) has been proven [10].
In order to get a lower bound on FoE ’s regret in the time T , observe that
FoE is a label-efficient learner [15, 16]: According to the definition in [16], we
may assume that in each exploration step, we incur maximal loss Bt. It is im-
mediate that the same analysis then still holds. For label-efficient prediction,
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [16] have shown a lower regret bound of O(T
2
3 ). Since ac-
cording to the remark at the end of Section 3, we have an upper bound of
O
(
( 1wi )
c+ kiT
2
3+ε
)
, this is almost tight except for the additive ( 1wi )
c term. It is
an open problem to state a lower bound simultaneously tight in both 1wi and T .
Even if the bounds, in particular 1wi , seem not practical, maybe FoE would
learn sufficiently quickly in practice anyway? We believe that this is not so in
most cases: The design of FoE is too much tailored towards worst-case environ-
ments, FoE is too defensive. Assume that we have a “good” and a “bad” expert,
and FoE learns this fact after some time. Then it still would spend a relatively
huge fraction of γt = t−
1
4 to exploring the bad expert. Such defensive behavior
seems only acceptable if we are already starting with a class of good experts.
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